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PREFACE 
In view of the potenial impact d o National Shelter Program on major policies as well as on 
the economy of the Nation and the lives of a l l  its citizens, we feel thot th. scientific informa- 
tion presented in  this pamphlut should be made available to al l  those concerned with this 
i ssue. 
Approximately 60% of the population lives in major metropolitan areas, which include cities 
and suburbs. It i s  to be expected that in case of war these areas wi l l  be attacked with 
nuclear bombs. As this population cannot be written off completely, shelters must be pro- 
vided to protect it against blast and heat as we1 l as against fallout. 
The papers by Salvadori, Paschkis, and Drew (on air supply and shelter) deal with conditions 
i n  shelters. People in shelters are exposed to radiation even i f  they manage to avoid con- 
taminated air from the outside or contamination from late-comers. Yet counting a protection 
factor (ratio of radiation outside the shelter to that inside) as only 100, it is  assumed in this 
report that within the shelter the radiation effects wil l  not be considered. 
Ullmann computes the cost of such shelters for a population of 120 million, taking as the 
structural cost one-half of the maximum mentioned in Salvadai's paper and thus consciously 
sacrificing a substantial portion of the urban population. If maximum figures are taken, the 
expenditures would be st i l l  higher than shown in Ullmann's paper. 
After a period, variously estimated at from two weeks to two months, people wi l l  have to 
Iewe their shelters. The only reason for building shelters in the first place is  supposedly 
to allow a society to be rebuilt at least vaguely similar to ours and hence based on tech- 
nology. 
The people leaving shelters will, however, face serious problems. These a n  discussed by 
Drew (water supply), Yost (radiation effects on the body), Dobzhansky (gene t ic effects: 
dangers to future generations) and Melman (industrial potentialities in a post-attack era). 
These paperr spell out the hazard upon leaving the sheher and the near-impossibility of 
survi va I. 
It sti l l  might be held that protection, whatever i ts  cost, shou Id be attempted even if i t saves 
only a minute fraction of our popu lation. 
However, in the final paper, Klineberg shows that from a psychological viewpoint shelters. 
may not only fail to deter bu~, i n  fact, may substantially increase the probability of war. 
Eoch author bears the responsibility for his individual contribution to this series 
of studies. 
COST OF BLAST-RESISTANT STRUCTURES 
BY MARIO G. SALVADOR1 
Professor of Civil Engineering and Architecture 
Columbia University 
A bare shelter structure designed to withstand the blast effect of a 20-megaton 
nuclear bomb at the rim of the ball of fire would cost $290 per person sheltered. 
Because of the o h  effects of such a weapon. the structure would not assure 
human survival. but would offer protection only against the blast effects. Blast 
resistant structures designed to withstand pressures further from the point of dm 
tonation would cost relatively less. 
The table below gives the cost par sheltered person of the blast structure of a 
reinforced concrete box shelter capable of resisting the blast effect of a ground 
burst of a 20-magaton nuclear bomb at the given distances from the center of the 
explos ion. 
COST OF BLAST PROTECTION 
DISTANCE 2,1 2.9 
(miles from 
ground zero) 
OVER PRESSURE 80 
(Ibs per square inch) 
COST 
(per person) $290 
The reinforced concrete box gives 10 square feet of space per person and is 9 feet 
6 inches high, thus permitting four bunks to be stacked one above the other. Its 
modular span is  14 feet. 300 pounds of material per square foot, including the con- 
crete ncb ded for strength. are assumed over the shelter roof for radiation protection. 
The walls of the shelter are designed to resist the pressure of the blast wave 
traveling through the earth. The f l w r  of the shelter i s  6 inches thick. No elaborate 
foundations are assumed to be required to resist the pressure blast on the shelter. 
The reinforced concrete structure i s  so designed as to barely resist the blast; that 
is. so as to collapse for a small amount of pressure above that produced by a 20 
megaton bom b. 
The cost of the structure includes the necessary excavation in an average soil, 
and a 10% contingency increase to cover the cost of the openings. No elaborate 
door system, which may be needed for other than blast resistanceB is  considered 
in this cost. 
The price of concrete i s  assumed at $80 per cubic yard; it includes an average of 
6 pounds of steel per cubic foot of concrete and the cost of forms. 
The study conducted to calculate the table given qbove shows that the cost of 
the structure per person i s  insensitive to the number of persons sheltered: the 
table was obtained as an average of costs for shelters to be occupied by 5, 20, 
50, 100 and0500 persons. For large shelters to be occupied by hundreds of persons 
the structural cost may be halved in view of the possibility of organizing sleeping 
shifts, 
The range of distances for which the shelter gives protection against the blast 
goes from (the l imit of the fire ball (2.1 mites) to the distance at which a standard 
c iv i l  structure could stand the blast (1 pound per square inch of pressure). The 
cost of the structure at this outer limit i s  due exclusively to the need of radiation 
protection. The costs evaluated above are to be considered as low averages over 
the continental United States, and check the results of similar pub1 ished studies. 
A NEW LOOK AT THERMAL CC"7ITIn'1S IN f"'ELTERS 
BY VICTOR PASCHKIS 
Professor of Mechanical Engineering and Director of 
Heat and Mass Flow Analyzer Laboratory 
Columbia University 
Temperatures within fallout or blast shelters have not been fully explored. This 
has been acknowledged in papers presented before Congressional Committees. This 
paper seeks to explore four items of danger in connection with shelter temperatures. 
Three of these are influenced by the direct heat radiation of a nuclear bomb explos- 
ion, The fourth i s  not. 
I. Thermal Radiation from ihe Bomb 
A l l  nuclear explosions occur at temperatures prevailing in  the sun. Exposure to 
such tamperatUres even for seconds i s  lethal within a wide distance from the explos- 
ion. As this study deals with the effectiveness of shelters, the danger toexposed 
persons wi l l  not be explored further. People in shelters which are strong enough to 
withstand the blast w i l l  be safe against this direct heat exposure. 
11. Heating of Shelters chrough rheir Roofs 
The extremely high temperatures owing to thermal radiation wi l l  ignite a l l  in- 
flammable material to great distances. How far out (from ground zero) combus- 
tion wi l l  occur depends mainly on the size of the bomb, the nature of the in- 
flammable material, and on the height of the explosion from the ground. Charts 
1 and 2 show the distance to which ignition, characterized by crumpled news- 
' 
paper catching fire, may be expected for different bomb sizes and for an ex- 
plosion in'the air and on the surface. These charts (based on information in the 
McGraw-Hi l l study, *'Nuclear Attack and Industrial Survival," Jan. 1962) also 
indicate the area, in square miles, thus destroyed. 
Depending on wind conditions, and to some extent on the nature of the terrain, 
one must expect that the many individual fires started by the ignition of com- 
bustible material wi l l  consolidate either into a firestorm or conflagration. 
22.0 15.0 5.5 0 
miles 
35.0 223 9.0 0 
miles 
The firestonn i s  essentially limited to the area originally ignited by the many 
small fires (the areas designated on the charts). A-conflagration extends beyond the 
original confines of the fires started by the bomb. The duration of eiiher the fire- 
storm or conflagration is  unpredictable. Estimates of several authors vary from six 
hours to several weeks. Temperature near the center of a firestorm i s  above 2200 
degrees Fahrenheit; In Hamburg, following a firestorm ignited by incendiary bombs 
in 1943, an inspectiun of shelters showed h a t  glass had been melted (2000-2300 
degrees F). This observation can be used as a rowh gauge of the prevailinp 
temperatwe. 
As a result of the blast, and partly as a result of the fire, al l  structures in the 
zone of the firestorm must be expected to collapse. Thus any shelters in such 
arm wil l  be covered by rubble. This rubble, mixed with st i l l  smoldering material, 
wil l  remain hot for extended periods of time -- possibly several weeks. 
The roof of a shelter wil l  receive heat, first from the firestorm and then from the 
hot rubble. Fortunately, thi s heatflow produces in the she1 ter a temperature 
rise of only a few degrees. It i s  well to remember that i f  the thickness of the 
ro i l  a d  roof were decreused to less than the three feet assumed in the paper by 
Professor Salvadori, the thermal condition may become serious. Furthermore, 
such effects increase the shelter requirements for reasons similar to those described 
in the following section. 
Ill. Vmtilaiion Air 
One cannot expect shelters to be provided with bottled air or oxygen to such an 
extent as to eliminate all nssd for fresh air. Fallout shelter designs always in- 
clude a vent which must be kept tightly closed during the firestorm. Otherwise 
the firestonn would draw air out of the shelter, asphyxiating i ts inhabitants. If 
the wind should drive air into the shelter, it would be air at 2 0 0 0 O  F, which 
would bum h e  lungs of occupants tmmdiately (electric cremation furnaces 
operate at a temperature of about 16000 F). 
During the storm and h e  collapse of adiacmt structures the vent i s  in great 
danger. A hole can be knocked or bumed into the vent, opening the shelter to 
the infusion of hot air laden with radioactive debris. Or the vent can be 
damaged so that it wil l  not open when the firestorm is  over. 
It i s  practically unavoidable that the vent, at least in i ts lower part, wil l  be 
surrounded by rubble. Assuming that the vent remains undamaged, it wil l  have 
to be opened eventually to let air in. The hot rubble surrounding the vent wil l  
then preheat the air flowing through the vent. The extent to which this p r c  
heating wil l  take place cannot be predicted and depends, among other things, 
on the temperature of the rubble which may remain at 1,200° F for a long time. 
Air temperatures of several hundred degrees are possible. As thi s temperature 
i s  not known, the results of two extremely low estimates (300 F and SO0 F 
temperature r i  se due to exposure of the rubble) are examined in chart 3. The 
increase wil l  be more severe in larger shelters because the surface area of the 
shelter per inhabitant goes down as the shelter size increases. (This statement 
i s  based on a constant floor area per inhabitant and a standard height of the 
rhel ter.) 
Chart 3 
Temperature Rise DAYS 
The curves in chart 3 are basedon an air supply of five cubic feet per minute 
per person--a figure recommended by Broida ("Effect of Mass Fires on 
Personnel in Shelters": Technical Paper #XI, U.S. Forest Service, A u ~ .  1960). 
In normal l i fe within small spaces, a figure of 15 cubic feet per minute per person 
i s  recommended (see "Guide" of the American Society of Heating and Ventilating 
Engineers, 1961 edition). The greater the air intake, the greater i s  the amount of 
heat carried i4tO the shelter. 
For each air temperature rise two curves are shown, val id for a 20-person shelter 
' (14x14ft.;9.5ft.high)andfora500-personrhelt~r(70x72ft;9.5ft. high). 
Thus for air 300 F above shelter temperature (e.0. shelter at 700 F; air intake, due 
to preheat in the hot rubble at 100OF) the shelter with 500 people wi l l  reach a 
temperature increase of 30° f in about one day, while the smaller (20 person) shelter 
w i l l  reach the same temperature in 3.5 days.The curves take into cansideration 
thatooch body generates about 400 btuhr. (BTU i s  a measure of heat.) 
The tolerance of the human body to elevated temperatures depends on a number of 
circumstances, among which humidity i s  particularly important. In the shelter, be- 
cause of perspiration, the humidity wil l  be high, and heat tolerance wi l l  be rather 
low. 
K. Buettner (ASME paper 57 SA-20) indicates that under high humidity exposure 
to 9S0 F is  safe for about'l0 hrs., and to 900 F for about 100 hrs. Assuming an 
initial shelter temperature of 70° F, a 20 - 30° F becomes dangerous for a 
protracted stay in the shelter. 
IV. Heat Generation by the Body 
What are the chances of survival in a shelter far away from any explosion? 
It is  known that nuclear weapons cause fa1 lout which may drift great distances 
from the initial blast location. The only plausible claim for fallout shelters i s  that 
they wi l l  protect the population not living in obvious target areas, i.e., near any 
metropolitan area or significant military installation. In this case it is assumed that 
there would be no danger from fires, provided that --contrary to some serious 
predictions -- the conflagration does not feed on forests and fields. Yet even such 
favorable locations present a serious thermal problem. As long as the shelter is 
sealed in order to avoid intake of air laden with radioactive particles, the heat gen- 
erated by i ts inhabitants wi l l  raise the shelter temperature. This temperature rise 
wil l  reach dangerous levels in a few days, depending on the size of the shelter. The 
curves in Chart 3 marked "No Air Intake" hold for this condition,and show that 
the shelter temperature becomes unbearable after two days in large shelters and 
after seven days in small shelters. 
One might suggest that the air be filtered to eliminate the radioactive particles. 
But a filter would increase the power required for the air intake fan. As one cannot 
count on electricity in the shelter, the fan would have to be hand operated. Hand 
power may not suffice to draw air through an adequate filter. If air or oxygen can be 
provided in the shelter, the vent may be kept closed. 
The temperature rise in the shelter may be reduced by increasing the surface area 
of the shelter per occupant. The area of the 500-person shelter would have to be 
about 2.5 to 3 times larger than presently contemplated. This means the shelter of 
70 x 72 ft. thpt i s  9.5 ft. in  height would have to be replaced by one 180 x 78 ft. 
which is  25 ft. in height to meet the minimum of 2.5 times the original surface area. 
If introduction of air which i s  preheated by rubble is considered, the dimensions 
would have to be much larger. 
AIR SUPPLY FOR SHELTERS 
BY T.B. DREW 
Professor of Chemical Engineering 
Columbia University 
The primary requirements for shelter vehti lation are: 
( 1 )  Means of preventing air inflow for perhaps up to two days after a nuclear 
attack has ended. 
(2) Means thereafter, without dependence upon mechanical power, to draw in and 
expel1 air for a week or so. 
During the first period, the problem is not so much that of preventing the entry of 
radioactive dust as it i s  that of preventing the entry of air heated by the probable 
fire storm to dangerously high temperatures. 
The initial period may be much more than two days because it starts at the beginning 
of the attack. It may be possible to maintain the air in the sealed shelter suffic- 
iently pure to avoid suffocation. This would require numerous shallow, open pans 
of a chemical such as moist lime to absorb carbon dioxide and tanks of compressed 
air or oxygen to replenish that taken in by the occupants. 
The second period requires the provision of relatively large passages to the ex- 
terior so designed that they may be cleared of rubble, which might block them, and 
that they may be kept tightly closed dbring the initial period. 
There i s  no practicable means of filtering out the fine particles which would remain , 
suspended in  the air af ter two days. Therefore some contamination of the she1 ter by fine, 
possibly radioactive, dust wi l l  occur una~oidabi~. 
It might appear likely that by suitable design of the air exit a small heat supply can 
create sufficient stack effect to maintain adequate ventilation. Very possibly 
the body heat of the inhabitants added to heat evolved by lighting equipment and 
any powered equipment wi l l  be sufficient in itself to create the stack effect. 
In an intense nuclear attack some radioactive gases wi l l  be produced. These can- 
not be removed from the air supply by any known practicable means. 
COST OF A NATIONAL 
SHELTER PROGRAM - IN DOLLARS 
BY JOHN E. ULLMANN 
Professor and Chairman, 
Department of Management, Marketing, 
and Business Statistics 
Hofstra College, Hempstead, New York 
This section summarizes the costs developed in the preceding technical papers 
and traces the probable totals and their effects on the economy i f  a program of 
this magnitude is  put into practice. 
First, it has been assumed that 120 million people am to be sheltered. This st i l l  
leaves about 60 million without deep shelters but they are expected to be either 
in areas where direct blast and fire effects are not l i kely to be great, or to have 
to participate in waging the war on the surface as long as possible. This assump- 
tion would give some degree of protection to that 66% of the population that would 
likely be killed under one pattern of a 10,000 megaton attack (See McGraw Hi l l  
study, Jan. 1962, based on data by AEC, Rand Corporation and Joint Committee 
on Atomic Energy). No provision has been made for double shelters at home and 
at work. This might require at least another 20 million places, especially in metro- 
po 1 i tan area s. 
Shelters are assumed to be of two alternative sizes. They rely on stored commodities 
which compromises their usefulness once they are "depleted" - it may be impossible 
to restock them. In general, a two-week to two-month soiourn in the shelter might be 
expected, but to provide the survivors with a bare start of necessities in a hostile, 
post-attack world, food and water stores have been set at six months (see Ralph 
Lapp, Consumers Report, Jan. 1962, pp. 15-18). Even i f  the food supplies were 
for a two-month period only, the food costs would not be changed materially. No 
provision has k e n  made for repeat attacks. 
Land: 
The cost of land obviously depends on the location of the shelters. If in urban 
areas, existing structures would have to be razed. There are not enough parks, 
vacant land, etc. to accomodate any large number of shelters. If they are not 
right in the city, the urban population would be unable to reach them. As shown 
by Professor Paschkis, a 500-person shelter would occupy one-third of an acre. 
The cost of land for a single shelter would thus probably range from $20,000 
to $500,000 or much more. Millions of dollars might be involved at some 
sites. Therefore an average amount of $150,000 for each SO-person shelter 
would not be excessive. A 20-person shelter might be housed on suburban pro- 
perty at l itt le inaementol costs. Neverthekss, many would require the razing of 
cat least one house. A land cost of $8,000 is, therefore, a fair estimak. 
To sum up, land costs wil l  be: 
For 20 persons 
58,OOo 
For 500 persons 
$150,000 
Basic Shelter Stnrctum, excluding access: 
The basic shelter structure is based on one-half the maximum estimate by Professor 
Salvadori; that is, $145 per person. This st i l l  results in structural collapse within 
an area of 45 square miles for a 20-megaton bomb and may thus producs millions of 
casualties in several cities. Reducing this to 14 square miles would double the cost. 
In addition, the shelter wil l  be scaled up to avoid the thermal problem d w l t  with by 
Professor Paschkis. Accordingly, a structure cost of 2.5 times $145 or $362.50 per 
person is  derived. The only alternative would be to provide some form of air condi- 
tioning which is ruled out by the high pow.rrequirements. Moreover, i ts cost would 
be considerable. 
For 20 persons For 500 persons 
Shelter access: 
The cost estimates for this must necessarily be approximate. One of the reasons 
for locating shelters away from existing structures is  to avoid, as far as possible, 
major blocking of the access. Even so, entrance tunnels can cave in. No gener- 
ally applicable method of egress has been des&ibed thus far. Blasting out with 
shaped charges and similar methods require highly skilled personnel. It i s  thus 
only possible to rely on heavily reinforced entrances with mazes to block rad- 
iation and with blast doors, built like vault doors. The costs of these special 
products and structures wi l l  certainly aggregate at least $400 per person for the 
20-person shelter and $100 per person for the 500 person shelter. The latter 
would have to  have multiple exits; six have been assumed here. 
For 20 persons For 500 persons 
$8,000 $50,000 
Air Supply and Electric light: 
A two-week air supply is  necessary here to avoid intake of air heated by surface 
rubble (see Professor Paschkis' paper). A system using bottled compressed air and 
hydrated lime absorption of carbon dioxide is  considered here. This would have to 
include controls for air pressure inside the shelter, venting of stale air, some small 
source of power for air circulation and similar equipment. A small amount of lighting 
i s  included (5watts per person). Such a system would have to be developed and it 
could probably not be built and stocked for less than $1,000 per person. Recovering 
oxygen from the carbon dioxide would require a large power source and chemical unit, 
costing at least that much. If a stay longer than two weeks is  needed, however, it 
would have to be considered. Even so, the problems cited by Professor Drew would 
largely remain. 
Cost of air supply and electric light would be: 
For 20 persons 
Water supply and sanitation: 
For 500 persons 
$500,000 
A water supply of two gulloris per perwn per day has been assumed. This compares 
with 25 gallons per person per day used in (lome design. The simplest way would be 
to have a reservoir with the shelter in which a two-month supply could be stored. 
This does not deal with the limitations on post-attack' water supply cited by Pro- 
fessor Drew. No allowance is  made for artesian wells and the like. An alternative 
'&month supply should therefore be conkdcred. The cost of the water itself is 
neglected, but the reservoir would costabout $1.50 per cubic foot. The cost of the 
simple hand pumps may be assumed induded in this figure. 
An equal space i s  provided. for waste products. This is  required to drain the 
chemical toilets used in the first instance. The foll.owing costs are involved: 
I 
For 20 persons For 500 persons 
For six-month period: 
Water supply, 182 days at two 
gal Ions per day (75 gal Ion per 
cubic foot and $1.50 per cubic 
foot 'for reservoir) $72.75 per * 
:.u - person 
. . 
Sewage pi t  (some as ab-ove) . .  . . 
Chenrical toilets (one 'foi eaih- 
20 persons) a?$79 - ' 
. . . - . , .  
Food: 
The average food expenditures for a worker's family range from $1 to $1.25 per 
person per day (1961 Statistical Abstract of the United States, p. 337). If processed 
agricultural surplus, already paid for by the government, i s  used, only a processing, 
handling and storage charge of 35 cents per person a day i s  estimated. As noted be- 
fore, a six month supply i s  provided. 
Thus, food costs would be as follows: 
For 20 persons 
Food (354 per day, 182 days) $1,275 
Storage space (2 cubic feet per 
person per week @ $1.50 per cubic 
feet) 26 weeks 
Food preparation : 
For 500 persons 
$31,950 
Al  lowance for food preparation, equipment and utensi Is $3 per person: 
For 20 persons For 500 persons 
$60 $~,500 
Medicol supplies: 
A shelter would have to be equipped with medical supplies far more elaborate than 
the conventional "first aid kits." At the least, one would have to provide tranqui l i- 
zers, sedatives, antibiotics, digestive aids, anesthetics, as well as supplies for 
treating injuries, and, i f  then available, radiation. An estimate of $15 per person i s  
certainly reasonable. 
The totals for medical supplies and their storage are: 
For 20 persons For 500 persons 
$7.500 
Tools, utensils, and instrumentation: 
Here are included various tools for use in the shelter as we1 l as outside. These 
include radiation instruments, "fallout suits," flashlights and batteries, fire ex- 
tinguishers, axes, picks, shovels, hand tools, etc. An allowance of $40 per person 
is  reasonable here. The totals including storage space are therefore: 
For 20 persons For 500 persons 
$800 $20,000 
Furniture: 
Only the simplest bunks and personal lockers, etc. are envisaged, at a cost of 
about $15 per person. This gives a total of: 
For 20 persons For 500 persons 
THE TOTALS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 
The shelters are estimated to cost about $50,500 for 20 persons and $1,063,400 
for 500 persons, or from $2,125 to $2,525 per place. Applying this to the prospec- 
tive shelter population of 120 million, we would have a cost of $254 to $302 
billion. This i s  in the range of our present national debt and math i rd  of the total 
value of our structures in place. It would be about five times the total annual volume 
of construction. It i s  five to six times our annual collection of personal income tax 
and bears the same relation to our current defense expenditures. It is, in fact, 
about equal to our total annual personal income. 
Our national debt was increased by $243 billion between 1940 and 1947. In that 
time the value of the dollar was halved. A shelter program such as this would 
have to be put in place in about two years to have military value. Such pressure, 
coupled with the limitations of our industrial capacity in several areas of potential 
supply, would require us to submit to controls over our property, our labor, and 
our daily lives more thorough than ever devised by any society, least of a l l  the 
United States. It would mean the end of a l l  other construction - schools, hospitals, 
houses, factories, machinery and armaments. As it is, no restrictions due to schdw  
ling, industrial preparation and the like are considered. Even if the above estimate, 
which is based on current dollars, were to be high by as much as one half, this would 
sti l l  be true. In fact, to alleviate the shortco ' would have to be 
substantially increased. - .+p '% ! m-fl pi* 
A parallel effort to secure industrial reserves, communications, etc. would at 
least double these amounts. At the same time there would be a precipitous drop 
in the international value of the dollar, impairing the financial stability of the 
whole West. 
Anyone who~treasures the freedoms we have, who believes that our varied and 
versatile industrial establishment is  a major source of strength and who eniays 
the good things our country has to offer, cannot but be appal Id at the possibility. 
WATER SUPPLY IN POST-ATTACK PERIOD 
BY T.B. DREW 
Professor of Chemical Enginmting 
Columbia University 
' ' Water, water everywhere 
And al l  the boards did shrink, 
Water, water everywhere 
Nor any drop to drink." 
--from Rime of the Ancient Mariner 
by Samuel Taylor Coleridge 
The pressing problem of water supply arises of t w  the immediate post-attack period. 
The provision of canned or barrel Id watw for a week or so inside a shelter appear s 
both possible and practical. The renewal of the supply raises l ife and death problems. 
Prudent planning must assume not only that water mains wi l l have been broken, but 
also that reservoirs and their watersheds, along with shallow wells, wi l l  have been 
grossly contaminated by the deliberate use of '@dirty bombs." Such bombs might 
be designed to deposit di fficult-to-remove isotopes. 
The only source of potable water for some weeks would be from deep artesian 
we1 Is. These, in most cases, would remain uncontaminated indefinitely because 
the soil through which water percolates over long distances has some natural ion 
exchange and fi l tratim capacity. 
On the other hand, the decontamination of reservoirs and watershed can may be 
accomplished only by time and the action of rainfall. Ordinary water-treating 
techniques wi ll not necessari ly suffice to reduce the contamination. Furthermore, 
unless they have been locally stored, common water-treating chemicals wi l l  not 
be available. 
The suggestion for using ion-exchange resins for decontaminating water supplies, 
though appealing, is  largely illusory. It depends either upon the availability of 
replacement resin or upon the independent availability of pure water to revivl* 
the resin. 
The anticipated result of a widespread attack would entail such destruction of 
industry and transportation facilities that replacement of resin from other than 
locally buried stores could not be assumed. 
Prudent planning requires that deep wells, from 100 to 200 feet, be drilled in 
advance. Because in many areas the water table is  so low that hand pumping is not 
feasible and no power from mechanical sources would be available, substantial 
stores of fuel must be laid in. This would ba used for internal combustion engines 
for pumping. 
After a somewhat indeterminate, but moderute, period, rainwater would be reason- 
ably potable cnd, in regions of adequate rainfall, could replace the deep wells if 
decontaminated receiving basins could be devised by the survivors. 
BY HENRY T. YOST, JR. 
Associate Professor of Biology 
Amherst College 
In a certain sense, the people ot the northern hemi sphere are part of a gigantic 
experiment to determine the effects of irradiation at low levels. Until the results 
of this experiment are in, we w i l l  not be able to point to sufficiently large stores 
of data to say exactly what w i l l  happen. On the other hand, the information we 
have, and the thaory on which our investigations are now based, indicates that 
any exposure to radiation is  harmful. 
To think that we can escape some effects of radiation i s  greatly misleading. We 
are in  a position similar to traffic safety officers who are setting a speed limit. 
A limit of 40 miles per hour does not mean that no one w i l l  die or be seriously 
injured at that speed; it means that we are willing to tolerate a certain amount of 
damage which we predict w i l l  come i f  the speed limit i s  not exceeded. 
The recommended level for the exposure of human beings is  such a "speed limit". 
We agree that no one should get more than 10 r in his reproductive lifetime (about 
40 years). We say that this i s  "safe" because we can see no easy way to lower 
the dose at this time, and we know that human populations have been willing to 
, pay the price for such an exposure in  the past. It i s  a tolerable dose; a dose 
which contributes to the infirmaties of present-day man and to the heritable ab- 
normalities of the future. 
When we turn our attention to the prospects of nuclear war, we pass the bounds of 
I I safe'' doses altogether. It seems highly unlikely that the average dose received 
by sheltered survivors on the eastern coast of the United States could be less 
than 200 r. In fact, the report of the Rand Corporation on radiation protection con- 
tinually refers to 200 r as the nationwide average dose to be received. In the case 
of a 10,000 megaton attack this seems conservative. It is  obvious that there wi l l  
be cases where radiation levels are much lower than thi s. It i s  also clear that more 
effective shelters might be bui It, i f  the money were available and the enemy 
cooperative enough to keep his attack to some presupposed level; but the 200 r 
level i s  so frequently quoted, and so consistent with the available estimates of 
dose-rates after a nuclear attack, that it i s  realistic to confine our discussion of 
the effects of radiation to this level. 
The immediate effects of exposure would depend to a great extent upon the rate 
at which the dose was given. If the survivors received 200 r over the first month 
after the attack, the effects would be quite similar to the effects from an instan- 
taneous dose. Nausea and hair shedding would be most pronounced. In fact the 
shedding of hair is one of the best indications of exposure to radiation. As a 
general rule, when the hair grows back the exposed individual wi l l  recover from 
most of the immediate effects of radiation. Failure of the hair to return is an 
indication of serious damage, 
A dose of 10 r received in  a relatively short period of time (a few weeks) would 
be expressed in a depression of the white cell count of the blood and in a slight 
decrease in the production of anti bodies (those molecules which are produced to 
fight infection). At a dose of 100 r, radiation sickness i s  quite evident, although 
recovery w o ~ l d  be assured for 90-9596 of those exposed. At levels of 200r, about 
15% of the population would die from alteration of the blood forming elements 
and general radiation sickness. 
Another effect which cannot be neglected and which would be significant in the 
100-200 r dose range i s  lowered resistance to infection. It i s  to be expected that 
some areas o f  the intestine would undergo shedding of the lining which prevents 
germs (always present in  our food) from entering the blood stream. The result 
would be an increased incidence of ordinary infectious diseases in the surviving 
population. This effect would be coupled with a decreased anti body production 
and a lowered capacity of the organism to repair tissue damage brought about 
by impaired cellular activity. Thus, secondary illness w i l l  be a problem for the 
inhabitants of the shelters, both in the shelter and af tar emergence from shelter. 
The long range effects of exposure to radiation are even more serious. Through 
a mechanism which i s  not completely understood, the effects of radiation are 
stored in the body to a degree which results in  a shortening of the l i fe span. 
This l i fe span shortening can be estimated by the rule that 1 r wi l l  decrease the 
the l i fe expectancy by 110  days. An exposure of 200 r would cut between 1000 
and 2000 days from the l i fe  span, on the average. 
In addition to this, the incidence of a l l  types of cancer would be expected to 
increase. The first reports of the research committee on tumor statistics from 
Hiroshima indicate that the dose necessary to double the incidence of cancers 
of a l l  types i s  about 400 r. Therefore, we must expect that survivors in shelters 
wi ll show a 2540% increase in  the incidence of cancers of a l l  types. 
Leukemia should be considered separately, as it i s  apparently one of the "genetic" 
effects of radiation in somatic tissue. While there is  undoubtedly a threshold for 
the increase in most types of cancer, there i s  every indication that none exists 
for leukemia, that is, any dose of radiation wi l l  increase the incidence of this 
disease. Moreover, the doubling dose for leukemia seems to be lower than for al l  
types of cancer combined; therefore we must expect that the incidence of leukemia 
among the survivors wi l l  be very greatly increased. 
Sterility i s  another important somatic effect of radiation. Women are more sensitive 
than men, in this respect. A dose of 200 r w i l l  induce temporary sterility in males 
from which a slow recovery would be expected. (However, recovery i s  frequently 
not complete and we would expect a lowering of fertility.) On the other hand, recent 
evidence indicates that female sterility i s  permanent when induced. This i s  not 
surprising, as the number of cells involved in the production of eggs i s  less than 
the number involved in the production of sperm. At a dose of 200 r, we can estimate, 
conservatively, that 2550% of the surviving females wi l l be steri la. 
There are a number of other somatic effects to be expected in this dose range, but 
since they are less important, they wi l l  be only briefly mentioned here. Pregnant 
women wi l l  have to anticipate a relatively high chance of stillborn or deformed 
babies. Doses as low as 20 r are known to interfere with the normal developmental 
processes. The younger the developing chi Id is, the more susceptible it wil l  be. 
Hormonal imbalance i s  a short-range but likely event following exposure. This 
may result in noticeable changes in certain individuals who are already below par. 
The blood clotting mechanism wil l  be altered, with fhe result that cuts and bruises , 
may be mom serious and in extreme cases internal hemorrhaging may result. 
Finally, the effect on the nervous 'system i s  not clear. While no maior changes are 
to be expected, there have been a number of reports of changms in certain subtle bra 
brain functions after exposure. What this might mean to a surviving population in 
a r e s t r i d  shelter or emerging to the desolation following the attack i s  a problem 
which only the event itself can answer. 
The dose which wil l  k i l l  a l l  of the population i s  1,000 r (about one half of the 
population would die at 450 r). This dose i s  unlikely for people in shelters. How- 
ever, unsheltered people, animals and plants would receive doses far in  excess 
of this. Thus we must assume that other somatic effects can be neglected in their 
case. They would be dead. The consequence of this for the survivors i s  obvious. 
Pine trees are killed at doses of 5,000 r; a l l  mammals ond birds wil l  be killed by 
1,000 r. Clearly, the somatic effects of radiation on the sheltered survivors wi l l  
be most drastically expressed through the effect on non-sheltered life. 
As serious as these effects are, it i s  clear that the somatic effects of radiation 
are the most manageable of a l l  the consequences of a nuclear war. This i s  not 
surprising as fall-out shelters have been designed to meet iust this problem. 
Unfortunately, this aspect i s the least important effect of nuclear warfare. Blast, 
fire and genetic effects are far more important. What the shelter can do, at best, 
i s  to preserve the lives of a certain percentage of the population out of the blast 
and fire areas. It cannot reconstruct the devastated areas, resurrect the animals 
and plants for food production, or remove the radioactivity from the soil. It i s  
essential to realize that preoccupation with the somatic effects of radiation has 
lead most people from a consideration of the essential problems. 
It i s  time to forget an expensive and largely futile effort to solve one of the least 
important problems of a nuclear attack. 
DAMAGE THAT WEAKENS UX II-1 ..iN SPECIES 
BY THEODOSIUS DOBZHANSKY 
Professor of Zoology 
Columbia University 
One of the consequences of exposing people to high-energy radiation, such as 
would be released by a nuclear bomb explosion, would be genetic radiation damage. 
The generalized effect of such damage is  to increase the incidence of defective 
heredity. 
Defective heredity, in normal incidence, i s  the cause of much human misery. It is  
responsible for hereditary diseases, some of them grave and many incurable. It 
produces a variety of malformations and of bodi ly defects. It weakens vitality, 
vigor, intellectual abi I ity, and resi stance to infections. Obviously any increase 
in the incidence of hereditary defects in human populations would mean greater 
mi se ry for more people. 
Defective heredity arises through changes -- mutations -- in the materials 
transmitted in the sex cells from generation to g.neration, from parents to their 
children. Mutations, of course, have always been going on in  the human species 
as in  a l l  other living species. 
But radiation damage may greatly increase what may be considered the normal 
i n c l h c e  of mutations and thus add to the burden of defectivg heredity. Such 
damage inflicted in  our time wi l l  harm our descendants for many generations 
to come. 
There is  no such thing as a safe or permissible radiation exposure as far as genetic 
radiation damage is  concerned. No matter how small, a radiation exposure has a 
proportionate chance to cause mutations. 
If many people in the world are exposed to genetically damaging radiation, those 
not exposed can have l i t t le confidence of breeding a strong line of decendants. 
The reason i s  that harmful mutants can appear among their decendants whose 
ancestors from another line may have been exposed. 
This should serve to bring home to us that genetic radiation damage is not a 
private affair of this or that person or family. 
It i s  a concern of the whole of mankind. 
Why is  genetic radiation damage such a serious matter? After all, defective 
heredity has always been with us. It arises by mutation without known radiation 
exposure. Radiation damage merely increases the load of hereditary defects. I f  
the damage i s  small, tbe increase wi l l  be small. 
But wi l l  it be negligible? 
Thi s depends upon one's ethical standards. Is one human l i fe lost or made miser- 
able by hereditary disease or weakness to bc considered "negligible?" How many 
human lives should be sacrificed? Is it right to make more people suffer because 
* some peop e w ~ l l  suffer anyway? 
Biological science, and particularly genetics, has a lot to learn about genetic 
radiation damage. As is  almost always the case in rapidly developing fields of 
science, there i s  much di  scussion and even 4 sagreanent among geneticists about 
some issues. But there i s  practical ly  unanimous agreement among competent 
people that high-energy radiation does cause genetic damage. 
Big or little, this damage i s  undesirable- 
*"R - - I I IS'ISTRIAL S Y S T E M  UNDER A ::'_'CLEAR ATTACK 
BY SEYMOURMELMAN 
Associate Professor of Industrial and Managemen 
Engineering, Columbia University 
A nuclear attack of modest size could destroy, by fire effect alone, more than 
two-thirds of the manufacturing facilities of the United States. 
This conclusion, conservatively drawn, would mean the destruction of thi s country 
as a viable industrial system. The reason i s  that whatever industry remained 
would be without the intricate web of supplies and services that are essential for 
i ts  operation. 
An upprai sal of the impact of nuclear war on the American industrial system re- 
quires an understanding of the nature and the extent of industrial division of 
labor and interdependence. 
The condition of specialization and interdependence in  American industry was 
strikingly presented by Professor Wassily W. Leontief and others in a series of 
input-output studies of our economy1. A second example of this condition emerges 
from a simple analysis of the sources of supply that contribute to the stock of a 
single New York City supermarket. 
The following tabulations, based on the Leontief studies, record the condition of 
dependency of the industries that produce apparel, buildings, and transportation 
equipment. In each case there i s  listed the industries whose products are nec- 
essary inputs for the operation of the three main industries: 
Agriculture and fishing 
Industrial and heating equipment 
Merchandise and service machines / Iron and steel products 
Petroleum products and refining 
Coal and coke 
Manufactured gas and electric power 
Communications 
Pulp and paper 
APPAREL INDUSTRY Textile mil l  products 
requires inputs from 
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 
Construction 
Miscel laneous transportation 
Trade (domestic) 
Business and personal services 
riculture and fishing 
Agricultural machinery 
Engines and turbines 
Motor vehicles 
Industrial and heating equipment 
Electrical equipment 
lron and steel products 
Non-ferrous metal s 
CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY Non-metallic minerals 
requires inputs from Petroleum products and refining 
Coal and coke 
Manufactured gas and electric power 
Lumber and timber products 
Mi scel laneous manufacturing 
Business and personal services 
Iron and Steel foundry products 
Non-f errous metal s 
Non-metallic minerals 
TRANSPORTATION EQUl P- Petroleum products and refining 
MENT INDUSTRY Coal and coke 
requires input from: Manufactured gas and electric power 
This analysis means that when even one or two important inputs, such as power, 
are unovai lable, the industry cannot function. 
Regional analysis of industrial operations discloses important concentrations in 
particular states and localities. The manufacturing plants of the crucial machine- 
tool industry, for example, are concentrated in Ohio, Michigan, Connecticut, and 
Vermont. In these regions the most important concentrations further occur in  major 
metropol itan centers. 
Accordingly, destruction of production facilities in the major industrial centers . 
has a more extensive effect than i s  indicated by the value of the industrial assets 
that have been destroyed or the value of the industrial output that has been curtailed. 
Where the outputs of an industry an crucial to many others, as in the case of 
machine tools, the deranging effect from curtailment of production is multiplied 
into many other industrial sectors and regions as well. 
Another view of the condition of industrial interdependence in our society is  seen 
from a set of observations in a grocery supermarket located at 125th Street and 
Amsterdam Avenue in New York City. 
A l l  together there were about 2500 separate named items on the packaged goods 
shelves of that supermarket. Of these lo% were examined for location of process- 
ing plants from which the items originated. The 251 sampled items were shipped 
from 94 processing locations in the United States and five overseas. 
Twenty-nine states were sources of supply. The maximum number of items from 
any location was 42 - that location was New York City, itself. The map on the 
following page illustrates the variety of sources of supply in this supermarket 
from within the continental United States. 

Much the same pattern of supply sources would hold for every sizeable supermarket 
in the country. 
Effects d a Nuclear Attack on U.S. industry 
With this condition of far-reaching interdependence of our economic system firmly 
established in  our minds, let us now postulate what'would happen under a hypo- 
thetical nuclear attack. 
For purposes of this analysis we assume an attack on 65 maior metropolitan indus- 
trial centers by means of 20 megaton warheuds (or their equivalent in thermal 
effects) on each center. It wi l l  be noted that three warheads of 1-megaton each 
would produce even greater thermal effects than a single 20-megattn warhead. It 
wi ll be noted also that the total megatonage (1,300) used in this hypothetical attack 
is  slightly less than the amount that was said to be gRweil within the capabilities 
of a potential aggressorJ' at the June, 1959 hearings of the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy.' 
This analysis is  deliberately conservative, taking into account only the fire effect 
from such an attack and omitting effects owing to blast, radiation, and fallout. 
The fire effect from each 20-megaton warhead (or i ts equivalent in fire effect) is  
assumed to be a 25 mile radius around the center. This distance is  within the 
outer limit of areas for third degree burns for human beings from 20 megaton ex- 
plosions, as estimated by the Atomic Energy Commi~sion.~ As a third degree burn 
means the charring of the full thickness of the skin, it i s  assumed that the heat 
would be sufficient to set fire to many flammable materials within the assumed 
radius of 25 miles. Accordingly, a large number of fires would be started very 
quickly upon such an attack. 
Extensive fires, concentrated within a large area, produce a fire storm. A "fire storm" 
is  a high-intensity fire causing rapid consumption of oxygen and massive columns 
of rising gases. The partial removal of air at the surface is  filled in by winds 
moving with great force from the surrounding area, thereby accelerating the fire 
storm itself until a l l  combustible material i s  consumed. In the napalm bomb 
attacks on Hamburg and Tokyo during World War II, such fire storms were created.' 
Under fire-storm conditions, the bomb shelters within these cities became con- 
tainers within which occupants were either asphyxiated or charred. The numbers 
killed during the fire storm raids in major German and Japanese cities equaled 
and exceeded the number killed in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
High altitude photographs of the fire storms in progress show the spectacle of 
entire cities going up in flames. 
Sixty-five warheads of 20 megatons each (or three times that number of one-megaton 
warheads) could be delivered on U.S. metropolitan industrial centers by various 
means, including those that are both primitive and allow for l i t t le warning time. 
Soviet submarines could rise off the coast and launch primitive flying bombs 
simi lar to the German V-1 weapons of World War II. Such instruments, launched 
from a distance of about f ifty miles off the coast, could be set to fly at low 
altitudes to elude radar. Submarines could probably fire several such units before 
interception by defensive planes or vessels. 
Flying bombs of this sort could also be launched from freighters or even smaller 
vessels. Again, freighters or warships off the coast could launch medium range 
missiles to reach into the United States for 1,000 to 1,500 miles. Such missiles, 
with short travel time, would not allow for very much warning even i f  their flight 
was initially detected. 
Warheads could also be delivered by aircraft that are equipped for a one-way trip 
to the target area. These could approach American coasts from the seaward or 
southern side and at low altitudes. 
This enumeration, which surely does not exhaust such possibilities, i s  sxclusive 
of intercontinental missiles of the largest class. In this analysis, I proceed on 
the assumption that a determined agressor could mount multiple approaches to 
each target area with high probability of penetrating al l  known defensive systems. 
The meaning and the extent of this hypothetical attack is  indicated on the map 
reproduced on the following page. Circles of 25 mile radius are drawn to scale over 
meiropol itan industrial regions. The inset shows the New Y ork metropol itan region 
in somewhat greater detail. These are the areas within which fire storm effects 
of the sort discussed in  this paper would be expected from the explosion of the 
indicated sorts of warheads. 
These sixty-five urban placer correspond to the "Standard Metropolitan Statisti- 
cal Areas," a formal designation used by the Census of Population and the U.S. 
Census of Manufacturers. The "Statistical Abstract of the United States," 1960 
(page 790) discloses that these 65 urban centers account for about two thirds of 
total manufacturing and one third of the total population of the country. 
T h e  immediate e U e d s  of wide deshuction by fire storm alone in these industrial 
cmters  would k the destruction of the country as an industrial system. 
Such destruction also breaks the network of interconnections among al l  industries. 
Therefore the result i s  far more extensive in the disruption of production capability 
than i s  indicated by the direct effects. . 
When central sources of power, communication, and transportation are destroyed in 
individual areas, then the interlocking fabric of the productional divi sion of labor 
of society i s  torn apart. 
After such a nuclear attack the persons left alive in the areas between the metro- 
politan centers would be required, i n  short order, to provide their food, clothing, 
- and shelter by primitive means -- relying almost exclusively on manual methods. 
People who could not provide their elementary needs in this way could not survive. 
Regular supplies of fuel, power transportation and communication services that 
are required for the customary operation of industrial faci I ities would no longer 
be avui lable. farm tractors, under such circumstances, are transformed into metal 
monuments by the absence of fuel. Factories and workshops could only produce as 
far as self-contained power plants and fuel plus raw materials supplies permitted. 
Industrial recovery, from disasters even as great as the Second World War occurred 

under conditions where help became available from outside the disaster area. In 
a world war fought between the East and the West, the major industrial centers of 
the world would be destroyed. 
Assistance would have to come, if at all, from outside the Worth Amarican and 
European continents. Tha prasent level of industrial production in the Southern 
Hemisphere does not indicate the availability of large surpluses in fuel, power 
equipment tools, medical supplies, and consumer goods for use in saving survivors 
in the Northern Hemisphera. 
Would the Soviets attempt to destroy the American industry? 
One suggestion i s  that a 88rationa188 aggressor would strive to destroy direct 
military targets only -- the missile and aircraft bases. 
This assumes that an attacker would be prepared to leave intact an industrial 
system that could be used, after some delay, by an enraged population to mount 
desperate acts of revenge against the attacker who had scored a first round by 
interdicting weapons only. 
Modem industry is  the essential base for nuclear warfare with elaborate delivery 
systems and logistics of mass armies. 
From h i s  awlysis, I i t d  i t  unrrcrsonable to assume that industrial "recovery," 
as f i  is called, could t& ploce in any time period tliot would allow for a mean- 
ingful restorafton of tndcnfrial life. 
The assumption of a war&able 88movery" situation Is, however, one of the found- 
ations of civil defense programs. 
Insofar as American industry operates by means of a finely integrated division of 
labor, the fire effect alone of a modest-sized nuclear attack would render this 
society no longer viable as a significant production center of the world. 
FOOTNOTES: 
1. ''The Structure of the American Economy 1919 to 1939," by Wars i ly  W. 
Leontief and others, Oxford University Press, New York, 1951, second edition. 
2. "Biological and Evironnuntal Effects of Nuclear War," Hearings before the 
special subcommittee on radiation of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 86th 
Congress, June 22-26, 1959, P. 15. 
3. "The Effects of Nuclear Weapons," S. Glasstone, Atomic Energy Commission, 
P. 299 
4. See books by Martin Caidin, "The Night Hamburg Died," and '@A Torch to the 
Enemy," both published by Ballantine Books, New York, 1960. 
DANGERS OF THE SHELT-? PSYCHOLOGY 
BY OTTO KLINEBERG 
Chairman, Department of Social Psychology 
Columbia University 
For the individual, shelters are dangerous because they threaten to impair our 
cherished values. For the nation, shelters are dangerous because they reduce our 
wi 11 to f in d a peaceful solution to international problems and because they may 
convince our adversaries that we are expecting -- and therefore preparing for--war. 
To b r o w  beneath the ground for weeks, or even longer, means for human beings a 
denial of most of the values which have been acquired slowly and in the 
process of creating a democratic society. Instead of community there is  a splint- 
ering into isolated individuals or tiny groups. Instead of cooperation there i s  violent 
competition for available space. Instead of mutual oid, there is  a selfish struggle 
for individual ~urvivol. 
Psychiatrists speak of regression when adults behove in  a manner appropriate to 
children. We may speak of social regression when a whole community behaves in 
a manner characteristic of primitive. archaic, even animal-like existence, almost 
to the point of recreating a Hobbesian war of al l  against all. 
if our stake in the present ideological struggle i s  to preserve a way of life, we 
may well ask ourselves how much of our way of l i fe would be maintained under 
the conditions imposed by resort to shelters. Our democratic values would be 
submerged in a crass and cruel struggle for survival, made even more bitter be- 
cause the struggle may be futile. There wi l l  be imitations and frustrations arising 
from the enforced ond continued contact with others for an extended period without 
the relief of occasional privacy; there wi l l  be anxieties concerning those from whom 
one has been separated; there may even be a breakdown of psychological defences 
because of worries about the uncertain future. Prolonged incarceration under such 
conditions may be a devastating experience. 
More important from society's viewpoint are the wider implications of a shelter 
program for international relations. 
Psychologists and sociologirts have both stressed the importance of our attitudes 
as determining our behavior. When we believe that something i s  going to happen, 
we act accordingly, and as a consequence our be1 ief s may be transformed into 
real ity. 
The Columbia University sociologist Merton, for example, speaks of "the self-ful- 
fill ing prophecy". Suppose, for example, that in a small community a rumor i s  
started that the local bank is  in difficulties and is  about to close i ts doors. (We 
shall have to suppose further that in this particular instance the depositors are 
not protected by bank insurance.) The bank may on the contrary be perfectly sound, 
and quite capable of handling al l  withdrawals which it may expect in the ordinary 
course of events. The rumor spreads, however, and there is a run on the bank, which 
cannot meet the excessive demand for funds which i s  now placed upon it, and it 
does have to close i ts  doors. The prediction has come true because people acted 
upon it. 
The most direct application of this concept to international relations, and more 
particularly' to war, has been made by Havard Psychologist Al lport who speaks of 
the ttprinciple of expectancy". In essence this means that i f  we expect a certain 
event, and act accordingly, that event is  more likely to occur. The expectancy of 
war, therefore, increases the likelihood of war. 
There is  nothing mysterious about this principle, i f  we add the proviso that the 
acts must be related to the production of the event. I f  a l l  of us expect rain to- 
morrow, that wi l l  make no difference to the weather, as obviously our behavior is  
irrelevant to this particular outcome. If, on the other hand, everybody expected 
stocks to go down, and therefore sold out in  a hurry, that would create an atmo- 
sphere which could certainly contribute to a drop in their value. 
The lute President Franklin Do Roosevelt had a clear conception of this mechanism 
of "expectancys8 when he told us that a l l  we had to fear ."was fear itself". 
As far as war i s  concerned, the expectation that it i s  definitely coming would 
prevent us from taking al l  possible measures to avoid it, and therefore make war 
that much more probable. The reverse i s  not necessarily true. War may come when 
we least expect i t. A l l  that is  being said is  that, i f  we do expect it, the chances 
of i ts  occurrence are increased. 
Thi s analysis has important practical consequences in connection with shelters. 
There i s  a real danger that the building of shelters wi l l  lu l l  the people into a 
false sense of security. It is  as if they were to say to themselves, consciously 
or unconsciously,: '@We have shelters. We are safe. Let  war come.8s This reduces 
our efforts to avoid war, ahd to that extent brings war, a l i t t le closer. 
The shelter program might also bring war closer because of i ts  potential effect 
on the USSR. As the Polit ical Scientist J o D o  Singer (Bulletin of the Atmk 
Scientists, Oct. 1961) has put it: "At the very least, it would suggest that we 
have markedly raised our own estimate of the probability of stmtegic nuclear war, 
and are therefore hoping to minimize i ts destructiveness." (p. 313) As a cons* 
t # quence, our potential adversaries could assume that we are giving more serious 
consideration to an opening blow ourselves", or he could assume "that we are 
more convinced that he i s  planning a surprise attack and are preparing against it. 
In either case, it would be legitimate for him to give greater consideration to 
opting for that very opening strike himselfn8. 
This analysis is  psychologically sound, and reflects the dangerous potential ef- 
fects of the shelter program not only on our own attitudes, but also on those of 
our adversary. The tendency to regard shelters as ttinsurance88 against attack i s  
bared on a mi sunderstanding. 
L i fe  insurance does not cause us to take greater chances than we would normally, 
nor in  the case of l i fe  insurance, contrary to the case with shelters, do we have 
adversaries who ate more likely to attack us just because we are insured. 
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